may reform in rear before again coming into the line in full force. This, we fear, may exercise a far-reaching effect on the power of Russia for the offensive during the year 1917. The lack of heavy guns and ammunition which, in 1916, prevented Russia from developing her full strength, and which we had hoped to overcome by the additions to be made to the Russian armament during the next few months may, we fear, again hamper the offensive of our great Eastern Ally, since the additional heavy guns will, for defensive purposes, have to be spread over the greatly increased length of front.

9. The Central Powers, we apprehend, may seek, if they think fit, to pursue their offensive far into the heart of Russia, either in the direction of Odessa or in the direction of Petrograd.

10. Or, alternatively, the Central Powers may prefer, when they have established themselves on the shortest possible defensive line in the East, to transfer a portion of their forces to attack the Allies at Salonika, and to overwhelm us in that theatre.

. . . According to our military advisers, the Allies, at their present strength, should be able to maintain themselves against any attack which the enemy can bring against them in the Balkan theatre, but only by the evacuation of

Perils of the Eastern Front

The Balkan situation

Monastir ; the consequences of abandoning Monastir, however, are not agreeable to contemplate. It will open the way for direct communication between the Central Powers and Greece, and may lead to the intervention, on the side of the enemy, of yet another Balkan State, a weak one, it is true, but